/*
* RSA key generation.
*/
#include
#include "ssh.h"
#include "mpint.h"
#define RSA_EXPONENT 37 /* we like this prime */
int rsa_generate(RSAKey *key, int bits, progfn_t pfn,
void *pfnparam)
{
unsigned pfirst, qfirst;
key->sshk.vt = &ssh_rsa;
/*
* Set up the phase limits for the progress report. We do this
* by passing minus the phase number.
*
* For prime generation: our initial filter finds things
* coprime to everything below 2^16. Computing the product of
* (p-1)/p for all prime p below 2^16 gives about 20.33; so
* among B-bit integers, one in every 20.33 will get through
* the initial filter to be a candidate prime.
*
* Meanwhile, we are searching for primes in the region of 2^B;
* since pi(x) ~ x/log(x), when x is in the region of 2^B, the
* prime density will be d/dx pi(x) ~ 1/log(B), i.e. about
* 1/0.6931B. So the chance of any given candidate being prime
* is 20.33/0.6931B, which is roughly 29.34 divided by B.
*
* So now we have this probability P, we're looking at an
* exponential distribution with parameter P: we will manage in
* one attempt with probability P, in two with probability
* P(1-P), in three with probability P(1-P)^2, etc. The
* probability that we have still not managed to find a prime
* after N attempts is (1-P)^N.
*
* We therefore inform the progress indicator of the number B
* (29.34/B), so that it knows how much to increment by each
* time. We do this in 16-bit fixed point, so 29.34 becomes
* 0x1D.57C4.
*/
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PHASE_EXTENT, 1, 0x10000);
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_EXP_PHASE, 1, -0x1D57C4 / (bits / 2));
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PHASE_EXTENT, 2, 0x10000);
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_EXP_PHASE, 2, -0x1D57C4 / (bits - bits / 2));
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PHASE_EXTENT, 3, 0x4000);
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_LIN_PHASE, 3, 5);
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_READY, 0, 0);
/*
* We don't generate e; we just use a standard one always.
*/
mp_int *exponent = mp_from_integer(RSA_EXPONENT);
/*
* Generate p and q: primes with combined length `bits', not
* congruent to 1 modulo e. (Strictly speaking, we wanted (p-1)
* and e to be coprime, and (q-1) and e to be coprime, but in
* general that's slightly more fiddly to arrange. By choosing
* a prime e, we can simplify the criterion.)
*
* We give a min_separation of 2 to invent_firstbits(), ensuring
* that the two primes won't be very close to each other. (The
* chance of them being _dangerously_ close is negligible - even
* more so than an attacker guessing a whole 256-bit session key -
* but it doesn't cost much to make sure.)
*/
invent_firstbits(&pfirst, &qfirst, 2);
int qbits = bits / 2;
int pbits = bits - qbits;
assert(pbits >= qbits);
mp_int *p = primegen(pbits, RSA_EXPONENT, 1, NULL,
1, pfn, pfnparam, pfirst);
mp_int *q = primegen(qbits, RSA_EXPONENT, 1, NULL,
2, pfn, pfnparam, qfirst);
/*
* Ensure p > q, by swapping them if not.
*
* We only need to do this if the two primes were generated with
* the same number of bits (i.e. if the requested key size is
* even) - otherwise it's already guaranteed!
*/
if (pbits == qbits) {
mp_cond_swap(p, q, mp_cmp_hs(q, p));
} else {
assert(mp_cmp_hs(p, q));
}
/*
* Now we have p, q and e. All we need to do now is work out
* the other helpful quantities: n=pq, d=e^-1 mod (p-1)(q-1),
* and (q^-1 mod p).
*/
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 1);
mp_int *modulus = mp_mul(p, q);
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 2);
mp_int *pm1 = mp_copy(p);
mp_sub_integer_into(pm1, pm1, 1);
mp_int *qm1 = mp_copy(q);
mp_sub_integer_into(qm1, qm1, 1);
mp_int *phi_n = mp_mul(pm1, qm1);
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 3);
mp_free(pm1);
mp_free(qm1);
mp_int *private_exponent = mp_invert(exponent, phi_n);
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 4);
mp_free(phi_n);
mp_int *iqmp = mp_invert(q, p);
pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 5);
/*
* Populate the returned structure.
*/
key->modulus = modulus;
key->exponent = exponent;
key->private_exponent = private_exponent;
key->p = p;
key->q = q;
key->iqmp = iqmp;
return 1;
}